Context: The continuing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted global trade and energy flows, prompting comparison with the governance model developed for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
- The Malacca–Singapore experience demonstrates how littoral-state sovereignty, international navigation rights and user-state cooperation can coexist.
Malacca–Singapore Straits: Geographical Significance
- The Strait of Malacca, around 800 km long, lies between the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra, connecting the Andaman Sea with the Strait of Singapore.
- The Strait of Singapore, around 105 km long, forms the eastern continuation of Malacca and connects it with the South China Sea.
- Their strategic location makes them among the world's major maritime trade routes.
Territorial Waters: A Turning Point
- Historically, the Straits were treated like international waters, allowing relatively unrestricted navigation.
- Indonesia's 1957 archipelagic declaration asserted sovereignty over waters surrounding, between and connecting its islands.
- During the formulation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Indonesia insisted on a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea measured from its outermost islands.
- Malaysia subsequently adopted a similar 12-nautical-mile claim and chose cooperation with Indonesia through bilateral agreements and joint naval patrols.
- Since the narrowest sections of the Straits are less than 24 nautical miles wide, the territorial seas of Indonesia and Malaysia effectively meet, leaving no intervening high-seas or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) corridor.
- Singapore supported cooperation primarily around freedom and safety of navigation, given its heavy dependence on international shipping.
Evolution of Navigation Rights
- The territorial-sea arrangement initially meant that foreign vessels enjoyed innocent passage, subject to certain restrictions.
- During UNCLOS negotiations, the United Kingdom proposed the concept of transit passage for international straits connecting high seas or EEZs.
- Transit passage permits continuous and expeditious navigation and applies to warships as well as merchant vessels, going beyond the narrower concept of innocent passage.
- Indonesia eventually accepted the framework with reservations, while UNCLOS separately recognised the special status of archipelagic states.
- Malaysia raised concerns relating to environmental protection, insurance requirements and vessel draught.
Great-Power and International Cooperation
- Japan supported cooperation through the Japan-funded Malacca Strait Council, rather than pursuing internationalisation of the Straits.
- The U.S. and Soviet Union, despite their wider rivalry, supported maintaining internationally recognised navigation rights through the Straits.
- This demonstrated that littoral-state sovereignty and international freedom of navigation need not necessarily be treated as mutually exclusive.
2007 Cooperative Mechanism
- In 2007, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, with international stakeholders, established a Cooperative Mechanism for safety and environmental management.
- It built upon earlier traffic separation schemes, including arrangements developed for the Strait of Hormuz during the 1960s.
- User states and maritime industries contribute voluntarily to an Aids to Navigation Fund supporting navigation aids, hydrographic surveys and safety-related projects.
- Contributions are not tolls or mandatory charges imposed on ships exercising transit passage.
- The mechanism provides a model of littoral-state-led governance supported by international users and industry.
Strait of Hormuz: The Geographical Parallel
- The Strait of Hormuz similarly contains overlapping territorial waters of its two littoral states, Iran and Oman.
- Its strategic importance is much greater for global energy security because it connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea.
- Iran has not ratified UNCLOS and enacted a 1993 law requiring foreign warships to obtain authorisation before transiting the Strait.
- This remains a major point of disagreement concerning navigation rights and Iran's sovereignty claims.
Why Hormuz Is More Difficult
- The Malacca–Singapore arrangement primarily revolved around navigation safety, environmental protection and management of maritime traffic.
- In Hormuz, the central concern is more directly linked to Iran's national security and strategic control over the Strait.
- Gulf states have experienced both confrontation and economic cooperation with Iran, creating possibilities for regional dialogue.
- Qatar, among other Gulf states, has supported Iran–Oman discussions and has previously cited the Malacca–Singapore experience as a possible model.
- Even if regional states reach an agreement, acceptance by external military powers, particularly the U.S., remains an important variable.
Relevant Concept: Transit Passage under UNCLOS
- Transit passage is the right of ships and aircraft to navigate or fly through international straits connecting one part of the high seas or EEZ to another.
- It must be exercised in a continuous and expeditious manner and cannot be suspended by the coastal states.
- This differs from innocent passage, which is subject to greater coastal-state regulation and does not provide the same legal regime for international straits.
- The distinction is particularly important in Hormuz because disagreements over warship passage and coastal-state authorisation directly involve competing interpretations of maritime law.
Lessons for Strait of Hormuz
- The Malacca–Singapore experience suggests that littoral-state participation, international navigation rights and user-state contributions can form the basis of cooperative maritime governance.
- A Hormuz framework could potentially combine traffic-management mechanisms, navigational safety measures, environmental safeguards and regional security arrangements.
- However, unlike Malacca–Singapore, Hormuz involves deeper geopolitical rivalry and security concerns, making political consensus more difficult.
- The experience therefore offers a technical and institutional reference point, rather than a ready-made solution.
Way Forward
- Iran, Oman and Gulf states could explore a littoral-state-led cooperative mechanism for navigation safety and crisis management.
- Any arrangement would need clearly defined rules concerning warship passage, traffic management, security incidents and escalation.
- Participation of major user states and shipping industries could provide financial and technical support without compromising littoral-state sovereignty.
- Wider acceptance would require addressing the interests of both regional states and external powers, particularly those with significant military and commercial stakes in the Gulf.
