Context: The Supreme Court faces an unprecedented backlog of 92,318 pending cases at the end of 2025, raising concerns that its constitutional responsibilities are being overshadowed by ordinary appeals.
- The article advocates a two-tier Supreme Court structure, comprising a dedicated Constitutional Court and regional Courts of Appeal, to improve judicial efficiency and restore the apex court's constitutional role.
Issues with the Existing Supreme Court Structure
- Rising pendency: Pending cases increased from nearly 60,000 in 2019, when the sanctioned strength was expanded to 34 judges, to approximately 93,000 in 2025. Despite disposing of 65,615 cases in 2025, the Court received 75,410 fresh matters.
- Diversion from constitutional functions: Constitution Benches decided an average of 134 cases annually in the early 1960s, which declined to fewer than 10 annually over the last decade.
- Excessive Special Leave Petitions (SLPs): Discretionary appeals under Article 136 have overwhelmed the Court, accounting for 84.6% of its admission docket in 2011, despite being intended as an exceptional remedy.
- Contradictory judgments: The Court frequently functions through multiple small Benches, resulting in conflicting decisions and difficulties in maintaining consistency in legal interpretation.
- Institutional overburdening: Increasing judicial strength alone cannot resolve pendency unless constitutional matters and ordinary appeals are institutionally separated.
Proposed Two-Tier Judicial Structure
- Constitutional Court: A dedicated Bench of approximately 11 judges in Delhi to exclusively hear constitutional cases and substantial questions of law, ensuring authoritative and consistent interpretation of the Constitution.
- Regional Courts of Appeal: Establish four or five regional appellate courts to handle ordinary appeals, reduce the Supreme Court's caseload and bring appellate justice closer to citizens.
- Specialisation: The Constitutional Court would focus on questions affecting the Republic, while regional courts would efficiently resolve individual disputes and ordinary appeals.
Recommendations and Institutional Developments
- 229th Law Commission Report (2009): Proposed a Constitutional Bench in Delhi supported by four regional Cassation Benches to handle appellate matters.
- Parliamentary Standing Committee (2023): Recommended establishing regional Benches of the Supreme Court; the Union Law Ministry subsequently accepted the recommendation.
- 2016 Supreme Court reference: Three judges raised 11 questions concerning whether the Supreme Court was neglecting its constitutional responsibilities because of its ordinary appellate workload. The reference to a larger Bench remains unheard.
International Models of Judicial Specialisation
- United States: The Supreme Court sits above 13 federal Courts of Appeals and selects only a small proportion of cases for final adjudication.
- South Africa: Has a separate Constitutional Court in Johannesburg and a Supreme Court of Appeal in Bloemfontein.
- Germany: The Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe exclusively handles constitutional matters, while specialised federal courts deal with other legal matters.
- Brazil: The 1988 Constitution created a separate Superior Tribunal of Justice to handle ordinary federal appellate cases, relieving the Supreme Federal Tribunal of its dual burden of constitutional and appellate jurisdiction.
Need for Case-Selection Mechanisms
- Brazilian experience: Merely separating constitutional and appellate jurisdictions did not sufficiently reduce pendency. Improvement required additional powers to filter cases.
- United States model: The Supreme Court exercises discretionary review and accepts roughly 1% of the 7,000 petitions it receives annually, a power it has exercised since 1925.
- Brazilian model: Following the 2004 reform, constitutional appeals are entertained only when the question involves general repercussion, i.e., has broader significance beyond the immediate parties.
- Indian requirement: A dedicated Constitutional Court must have an effective case-selection mechanism to prevent congestion from shifting to the new institution.
Constitutional and Legal Provisions
- Article 136: Empowers the Supreme Court to grant Special Leave to Appeal against judgments or orders of courts and tribunals, subject to constitutional exceptions. It is an extraordinary discretionary power, not an ordinary right of appeal.
- Article 130: Provides that the Supreme Court shall sit in Delhi or at another place or places appointed by the Chief Justice of India with the President's approval. The 229th Law Commission Report suggested that this provision could facilitate regional Benches without a constitutional amendment.
- Article 145: Empowers the Supreme Court to frame rules regulating its practice and procedure, including provisions concerning Constitution Benches.
- Article 141: Declares that the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts within India.
Concerns Against Dividing the Supreme Court
- Dilution of institutional authority: Dividing constitutional and appellate functions may weaken the perception of one unified Supreme Court as the country's highest judicial authority.
- Unequal judicial hierarchy: Regional appellate courts may be perceived as inferior forums, encouraging litigants to seek further appeals before the Constitutional Court in Delhi.
- Risk of fragmented jurisprudence: Separate institutions may create competing interpretations and weaken the consistency and authority associated with a single apex court.
Arguments in Favour of Reform
- Existing fragmentation: The Supreme Court already functions through multiple small Benches whose judgments sometimes contradict one another. Thus, its institutional unity is already weakened by excessive caseload.
- Restoring constitutional primacy: A dedicated Constitutional Court would enable regular consideration of significant constitutional questions, including fundamental rights and federal disputes.
- Faster access to justice: Regional appellate courts would reduce geographical barriers and accelerate the disposal of ordinary appeals.
- Beyond increasing judges: Raising the sanctioned strength to 38 in 2026, after expansion to 34 in 2019, has not addressed the structural problem. Judicial specialisation and workload distribution are equally important.
Way Forward
- Establish a dedicated Constitutional Court and regional Courts of Appeal with clearly defined jurisdiction.
- Introduce effective admission filters to ensure that only cases involving substantial constitutional or legal questions reach the apex constitutional tier.
- Ensure consistency through clear rules on judicial hierarchy, precedent and transfer of important legal questions.
- Undertake phased implementation, examining the constitutional and administrative requirements while safeguarding judicial independence and access to justice.
